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Both China and the Russian Federation still claim rightful
ownership of numerous small riverine islands which make up a
portion of their long Far Eastern border. While the majority
of the Russo-Chinese border disputes have been laid to rest,
the disposition of these islands has prevented the two
countries from completely finalizing a border agreement.
The objectives of this thesis is to concentrate on the
historical backround of the border dispute, trends in current
bilateral border talks, and to identify a potentially
dangerous new ingredient which may dampen hopes for a
successful new agreement - Chinese influx into the Russian Far
East. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that both Russia and
China, at the government to government level, will strive to
maintain the status quo, but that on a local level, continued
disagreement and intransigence on both sides will continue and
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Both China and the Russian Federation still claim
rightful ownership of numerous small riverine islands which
make up a portion of their long Far Eastern border. Both
countries, over a period of approximately three hundred
years, have physically occupied the islands in question, but
the current disposition of the islands in question has yet
to be finalized.
The Russian and Chinese governments have recently signed
border agreements, and are jointly demarcating the border.
The border agreements are, however, not finalized as the
riverine boundaries and the ownership of the islands located
therein, have not yet been agreed upon.
The objectives of this thesis is to concentrate on the
historical backround of the border dispute, trends in
current bilateral border talks, and to identify potential
problems which could disrupt the normalization process which
the Russians and Chinese are currently undergoing.
Historical backround of the Russian expansion into the
Far East and their intitial contact, and subsequent dealings
with the Chinese is provided as an introduction. The
research then turns to border talks and Russo-Chinese
vii
efforts to physically demarcate the border. The differences
between the governments' policies with regard to the border,
and the feeling and actions of the regional poulation are
then covered. In addition, a recent trend of Chinese
influx, to include illegal immigration and crime, into the
Russian Far East has caused a great deal of concern among
local and government level Russians alike. In light of
this, though overall Russo-Chinese relations have improved
greatly in recent years, there are still significant
obstacles which still need to be removed before the Russians
and Chinese will enjoy truely normal relations.
At this writing the Russians and Chinese have signed a
border agreement, but it is not conclusive. Talks remain
open and additional high level summit meetings, during which
border issues will be discussed, will continue to be held on
an annual/bi-annual basis, however, the final disposition of




A. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
The definition of the word border according to The
American Heritage Dictionary is:
bor ' der . 4. The line or frontier area separating




The current border as it stands, between the Russian
Federation and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), is the
result of over 300 years of confrontation, sometimes bloody,
between these two regional powers. The confrontation over
the border started in the 17th century when the first
Russian settlers ventured into the river basin known as the
"Black Dragon" and continues to this very day. At the
center of the dispute is the Amur-Ussuri River Basin. The
history of the two empires since their first encounter
during the 17th century has varied from pitched battles to
enduring peace. The border has been one of the important
issues that has determined the course of Sino-Russian
: The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition
,
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1985.
-"Black Dragon" is the Chinese term for the Amur family of
Asian rivers which include the Amur and Ussuri rivers. They are
northern flowing rivers which travel through thousands of miles
of forests and tundra on their way to the Sea of Okhotsk.
relations and we believe that an equitable demarcation of
the border is necessary for continued peaceful relations
between these two powers. The Amur-Ussuri River Basin has
been the focus of a new effort by the governments of the
Russian Federation and the PRC to solve "once and for all"
this potentially volatile issue.
The objectives of this thesis will concentrate on the
historic background of the border dispute, trends in current
bilateral border talks, and identify a potentially dangerous
new ingredient which may dampen hopes for a successful new
border agreement-- Chinese influx into the Russian Far East.
The historical background, which is the most important
aspect of this thesis, will include a description of the
first contact between Russian settlers and the Chinese
Empire (Chapter II) which date back to 1643. This initial
historical background is followed by a description of the
"Unequal Treaties" (Chapter III) signed between the Russian
and Chinese Empires in the 19th century. These treaties
were imposed upon China when Russia took advantage of
Chinese weakness, due to military conflict between China and
other European powers, specifically England and France, and
extended their eastern frontiers into territory which had
been established as Chinese over a hundred years earlier.
China's relations with the Soviet Union, and now Russia,
have been periodically marked by attempts to reassert
China's sovereign independent status and efforts to recoup
the losses of the Empire'. The late 1960's saw a dramatic
increase in harsh rhetoric and polemics exchanged between
the PRC and the Soviet Union. The widening gap in the
relations between the two continued in a downward spiral and
reached its nadir in the latter stages of Mao Tse Tung's
Cultural Revolution. The PRC government continued to
heatedly raise the issue of lost territory and the unequal
treaties which the Chinese maintained were "imposed under
duress." The Chinese and the Soviets eventually came to
blows over these issues. The build up to, and the actual
March 1969 border fighting, which took place on frozen river
islands, will be described in the next section (Chapter IV)
.
The next part of the thesis (Chapter V) will cover the
swift cessation of hostilities, progress toward normalizing
relations between the two countries, and military confidence
building measures. The issue of regional security from a
Russian perspective will also be included in this chapter.
A key aspect of the normalization of relations between
Gary L. Scott, Chinese Treaties , New York, Oceana
Publications, Inc., 1975, pp. 27-28.
the PRC and the Soviet Union (and subsequently with the
Russian Federation) has been an equitable demarcation of
their long common border, the Amur basin in particular. A
description of the border talks and subsequent agreement in
1991 (Chapter VI) will follow. In this chapter the physical
demarcation of the border, the feelings of both high level
government officials and local inhabitants, as well as
current and future summit meeting will be covered.
We have also identified a potentially explosive issue
in the relations between the PRC and the Russian Federation
-the influx of Chinese nationals (which includes illegal
immigration) into the Russian Far East. This problem,
described in the next section (Chapter VII), has raised
serious concerns among both local Russians and government
officials as the influx of Chinese has impact on
demographics, political power, the local economy, and crime.
The conclusion (Chapter VIII) of the thesis will tie
the previous chapters together and present prospects and
implications for a possible future.
B . IMPORTANCE
The impact of the relationship between Beijing and
Moscow on the stability, cooperation, and security in the
Amur-Ussuri River Basin is of great significance. The
threat of future hostilities over the border is at an ail
time low, however, if the current positive course of
relations between Russia and China were to sour, the
potential for conflict would rear its ugly head. This would
have a damaging effect on the stability of the countries
surrounding the Pacific Rim and the rest of the world.

II. THE RUSSIAN PUSH INTO EAST ASIA
A . OVERVIEW
What were the underlying factors which caused the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People's
Republic of China (PRO, two communist states which only a
decade earlier were close allies, to engage in regimental
level combat over disputed river islands and border
demarcation in March of 1969? In order to answer this
question one must delve into the depths of history and
explore the very first contacts between these two. We
believe this to be relevant to the clashes of twenty-five
years ago, however different the former governments and
political systems may have been than from those governments
which were in power in the late 1960's. The history of the
two empires from their first encounters with each other in
the Amur river valley during the mid-seventeenth century
varies between pitched battles and enduring peace.
The Chinese and Russian empires first collided in the
Amur River valley. The local population was politically
subordinate to the newly developing C'hing dynasty, paying
tribute to their Manchu suzerains in Peking. The Russians,
who had moved south from central Siberia in search of new
arable land to raise and harvest crops in order to alleviate
food shortages in Siberia, were, relative to the Manchus, in
a position of great weakness. They were lacking in
personnel and were overextended due to extremely long lines
of communication and supply. Due to vastly different social
and political orientations of the two empires, military
confrontation was inevitable. The subsequent fighting
ensued on and off for the next several decades and after a
series of defeats, the Russians sued for peace. The first
treaty, which the Chinese negotiated from a position of
strength, demarcated the boundary between the two empires
and led to a peace which lasted approximately 165 years.
With the subsequent decline of China in the nineteenth
century, Russia, along with other European powers, took
advantage of Chinese weakness and extended their eastern
frontiers into territory which had been established as
Chinese over a hundred years earlier. The extensive land
grabbing conducted by the Russians was eventually halted
after a series of treaties was negotiated with the Chinese
government. These are the treaties which have been referred
to as "the unequal treaties" by the Chinese government.
As the relationship between Russia (and later the
Soviet Union) and China ran its course, the issue of unequal
8
treaties "imposed under duress" periodically came to the
fore. China's relations with Russia since the founding of
the Republic in 1911, continuing through the establishment
of the People's Republic, and up to the point of hostilities
in the late 1960 's, have been marked by attempts to reassert
China's sovereign independent status and efforts to recoup
the losses of the Empire."
B. RUSSIAN EXPANSION INTO ASIA
"For five centuries, Russians have been seeking a final
frontier which they never find."
Russian expansion into the Asian frontier began not
long after Ivan the Terrible captured the Tartar city of
Kazan in 1552. Russian pioneers acting in the Tsar's name
began to penetrate beyond the Urals into the vast area of
Siberia. Yermack the Cossack conducted numerous raids into
western Siberia between 1579 and 1584, captured the city of
Sibir from the Tatar Khan Kuchum, and formally opened up
"Gary L. Scott, Chinese Treaties , New York, Oceana
Publications, Inc., 1975, pp. 27-28.
William G. Bray, Russian Frontiers: From Muscovy to
Khrushchev, New York, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963, p. 11
Siberia to Russian exploration and settlement. The lure of
this area to the Russians was the prospect of expanding
~:.eir fur trade, though the addition of large tracts of land
into the expanding Russian Empire was also an incentive.
The pioneers, later supplemented by Cossacks and regular
army troops, used the rivers (the Ob, Enisei, Lena, and Amur
systems) for travelling and constructed wooden forts at key
points along them. Given the time period and the fact that
local indigenous populations resisted the Russians on
occasion, the expansion into Siberia and the Far East was
remarkably rapid. In just sixty years (1579-1639) of
eastward expansion, the Russians reached the Pacific Ocean
and Sea of Okhotsk.
In the period from 1580 to 1648 Russia pushed from the
Urals to the Pacific, acquiring over four and a half million
square miles of additional territory. The conquests of this
period did not include the Amur or Ussuri regions, which
were taken over later. In the initial drive across the
Siberian Plain, the Russian pioneers met little armed
resistance from the native populations they encountered.
When the native tribes attempted to resist Russian
J. N. Westwood, Endurance and Endeavor: Russian History
1812-1971
, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 134.
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domination, the battles which ensued were typically one-
sided as the natives lacked organized armies and weapons.
The Russians' real enemy during this time was the weather
and the ruggedness of the terrain. Even though the natives
did not militarily resist the Russians to any significant
degree, their dealings with the indigenous populations the
Russians were rather harsh.
Historians often compare the Russian advance across
Siberia to the American westward expansion, and there are
strong resemblances." Russians and Americans both sought
new sources of. fur in the wilderness. Settlers followed the
fur traders, and new towns sprang up. The first of these
permanent Siberian settlements, Tyumen, was founded in 1586.
Yakutsk was reached in 1637, and just two years later the
Russians reached the sea. This eastward expansion
continued, and by the 18th century Russian pioneers reached
across the Bering Strait and established settlements in
Alaska, Oregon, and California. In contrast, the Russians
refrained from expansion southward during earliest stages of
William G. Bray, Russian Frontiers: From Muscovy to
Khrushchev
, New York, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963, p. 47.
"Mark Mancall, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations
to 1728
, Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 9.
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their eastward expansion probably in order to avoid conflict
with the Chinese Empire.
As was noted earlier, Russian expansion into the Far
Eastern Territory was based on the desire to acquire land
for military and commercial uses. But an underlying factor
for this expansion, which was considered the more noble
cause, was the civilizing role of God, specifically the
Russian Orthodox faith. The Slavophiles, especially the
ones whose doctrine espoused Pan-Slavism, began to claim
that the Russians had a moral right to impose themselves on
Asia, since it was in fact an Asian nation. The Russian
advance into this area started to refer to itself as the
liberator of Chinese subjects from their moral oppressor,
the Chinese Empire. For their part, the native populations,
who were living on the periphery of the two empires, were
being pushed into the Chinese sphere of influence due to the
harsh treatment they received at the hands of the Russian
"liberators." In fact, the natives actually appealed for




C. THE PUSH INTO THE AMUR BASIN
The Chinese reaction to the Russian incursion into the
Far East, specifically the first in the Amur Basin in 1643,
(where the contested territory now lies) was initially one
of clashes between the Russian settlers and Amur natives
under the influence of the Manchu forces. The first Russian
expedition into the area was lead by a man named Poyarkov.
The Poyarkov expedition was significant in several
respects. First it provided the first Russian
eye-witness information about the Amur and its
resources. Second, it alienated the local
inhabitants along the Amur and warned the Manchus
to take steps to stop the barbarian invasion. 1 '
The second important attempt to conquer the Amur was
made by Erofei Pavlovich Khabarov. In April 1649 Khabarov
set out from Yakutsk, followed the Olekma route, and reached
Vasily Poyarkov was the leader of an expedition (1643-
1645) which was the first attempt by the Russians to gain access
to the Amur Basin where it was rumored abundant food sources
existed. His party killed or captured many of the natives in the
region. This action set the tone for the future relationship
between the Amur natives and the Russians. The Amur natives
would favor Manchu domination of the region because of this
incursion. Another result of this expedition was the discovery
of a major access route from Yakutsk to the Amur region. This
new route came to be known as the Olekma Route, and was found to
be more convenient than the Aldan-Zeya system used by Poyarkov.
••Mark Mancall, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations
to 1728
,
Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 23.
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the Amur region easily. Upon his return to Yakutsk about
one year later, Khabarov reported to the Tsarist authorities
that the Amur region was invaluable and could play a major
role in eastern Siberia's economy. Khabarov claimed that
grain had been found in large pits in deserced villages, and
concluded that only two weeks would be required to transport
sufficient grain to Yakutsk, and that only six thousand men
would be required to conquer the Amur Basin. -
Khabarov equipped a new expedition in the summer of
1650 and returned to the Amur. This expedition was marked
by conflict between the Russians and the local population,
the largest being in the vicinity of the Daur village of
Albazin. The Russians won several battles against the
natives due to their superior technology and firepower
(muskets over bows and arrows) and took foodstuffs and
cattle for their own uses. Again, Khabarov reported to his
superiors that the region was rich and could easily supply
Yakutsk's food needs for years. Additionally, he reported
that enough grain could be extracted from the natives to
feed twenty-thousand men or more. 1 '





out once again the following June. After four days, his
party reached the village of Guigudar, and for the first
time encountered Manchus. Khabarov's expedition stayed in
Guigudar for several weeks, demanding tribute from the local
population. In the countryside in the vicinity of the
village near the Zeya and Sungari rivers, he encountered
Duchers, Dahurs, vassals of the Manchus, and also Achans
.
The initial meeting was peaceful, however, a force of about
one-thousand Achans and Duchers attacked the Russians on the
night of October 8, 1651.-' Once again, due to superior
firepower, the Russians won the battle. What was to come
next, however, took the Russians completely by surprise.
The local populations, from whom the Russians had been
exacting tribute and generally treating harshly, turned,
unbeknownst to the Russians, to the Manchus for protection,
or if that was not feasible, then requested that they be
granted permission to "accept Russian suzerainty."' The
following spring (1652) the Manchus attacked the Russians in
the vicinity of Achansk (called Wu-cha-la by the Manchus)
.
•"Ibid, p. 25.
'Ibid, p. 25. Apparently these requests were forwarded to
the government in Peking, and subsequently a Manchu army was
raised for the purposes of finding Khabarov and his men and
driving them out of the Amur region.
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Due to faulty leadership and tactics on the part of the
Manchus, Khabarov and his men were able to repulse the
attack. The battle at Achansk was, however, only the
beginning of direct military conflict between the Manchu and
Russian empires. The next four years saw sporadic conflict
between the two sides, with each side winning its share of
battles. The Russians were, however, being steadily pushed
out of the region as it was at this time that the Manchu
empire was reaching the height of its power.
The conflict came to a head on 30 June 1658 in a battle
on the Amur River just to the south of the mouth of the
Sungari River. In this battle the Manchus won a substantial
victory and effectively cleared the Amur region of Russians
as far north as Nerchinsk, but the Manchus did not pursue
the Russians any further, and the stage was set for future
conflict in the region.- This defeat forced the Russians
to abandon incursions into the region on the official
military level, but it did not stop Russian and Cossack
"outlaws" from conducting raids and exacting tribute from
the native populations in the area.
- Ibid, p. 28.
^Ibid, p. 28. Official Russian activities were limited to




For the next several years, until 1660, several Russian
outlaw bands were destroyed or driven off by the Manchus,
and by 1664 relative peace had descended over the region.
The Manchus, having been lulled into complacency after
'several years of Russian inactivity, were slowly abandoning
the region. The reason for the withdrawal of Manchu
military power from the Amur area was because they needed to
put their efforts into quelling rebellions, which were
beginning to develop in southern China. As a result, the
Russians, however apprehensively, began to move back into
the Amur basin toward the end of 1664. Several more years
of Manchu inactivity in the north passed, while more and
more Russians were moving into the area and establishing
permanent settlements. 1 " When the Manchus finally settled
their domestic problems and were once again able to
concentrate on the Russian problem to their north, they
found that they now had to deal "not with outlaw bands of
-"Ibid, p. 31. At this time, in the mid to late 1660s and
into the 1670s, the Manchus were forced to deal primarily with
the consolidation of their newly formed C'hing dynasty (having
recently taken the reins of power from the Ming rulers) . This
problem was compounded by the fact the Manchus had a serious
shortage of soldiers with which to fight. The Manchus were thus
unable to pursue their victories over the Russians to the point
of expelling them once and for all from the basin.
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Cossacks, but permanent settlements officially integrated
into Russia's Siberian colony."
By the early 1680's, having consolidated their hold in
China, the Manchus took it upon themselves to establish a
position of military strength on their northern frontier
from which they could force the Russians to enter into
negotiations on terms favorable to the Manchus.- The
C'hing emperor's plan was, through military action, to
remove the Russian threat to his northern frontier, while at
the same time dispatching letters to Albazin, Nerchinsk, and
Moscow in order to get the Russians to enter into diplomatic
negotiations .- 1
Between 1681 and early 1685 both sides were engaged in
building up their respective force levels and constructing
defenses. The Russians were, however, faced with a shortage
of manpower, even though they were apparently determined to
1
'Ibid, p . 32 .
-'Given that the Manchus had at this time successfully taken
hold of power in China and firmly established their C'hing
dynasty, from this point on they will be referred to inclusively
as ' Chinese .
'
- ; Ibid, p. 115. The Manchu emperor, K'ang-hsi, did not seek
to conquer the Russians, but rather to demonstrate to them that
the Manchus were sufficiently strong to force them into a
negotiated settlement.
18
defend their settlements in the region.
-
On 23 June 1685 the Chinese were in position, with a
force of over three-thousand soldiers, to attack the
Russians at Albazin. The leader of the Chinese force,
Pengcun, was under orders by the C'hing emperor to demand
that the Russians surrender before resorting to violence.
-
Reportedly, the Russians were given such a chance to
surrender but refused. A battle ensued, and within a few
days the Russian garrison was forced to sue for peace.
During the following negotiations, the Chinese were
persuaded to allow the surviving Russians to evacuate, with
their belongings, to Nerchinsk. Meanwhile, having received
letters from the C'hing emperor, by the second half of 1685
the Tsarist government decided to "abandon its Amur lands in
the face of superior Chinese power."-"
The Chinese, for their part, once again did not follow
--Ibid, p. 131. The Russians were simply unable to overcome
the problems associated with the scarcity of fighting men and the
exceedingly long lines of communication and supply. By the time
war once again came to the Amur region, the Russians were grossly
unprepared.
'Ibid, p. 132. The emperor's instructions were to allow
the Russians a chance to surrender and return the land they
seized to China. If they did surrender, they were to be allowed
to return to their homeland.
'Ibid, p. 134. This was official policy. What was actually
transpiring in the Amur basin was a completely different matter.
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up their victory, but instead celebrated their limited
success. The Russians took full advantage of this and in
1686 moved back into Albazin yet again. Unfortunately for
the Russians, they were not satisfied to stay in Albazin and
take advantage of the favorable local conditions to harvest
crops in an effort to alleviate Siberia's food shortage. In
a bold and brazen act, a Russian expedition set south down
the Amur River in an attempt to re-establish the pre-1685
lines.- This expedition encountered a smaller Chinese
force and after a brief battle, forced them to flee. When
news of yet another Russian incursion into Chinese territory
reached the emperor, he was "incredulous, and decided to
initiate military action immediately."-'
The Chinese forces arrived outside of Albazin on 18
July 1686, and in keeping with the emperors policy, demanded
that the Russians surrender immediately. ' The Russians
refused, whereupon the Chinese laid siege to the settlement.
The siege lasted until 3 November 1686 when it was lifted by
order of the C'hing emperor, who had received word from the
-"'Ibid, p. 136. This expedition was also charged with
collecting tribute from the local populations, which had
previously been under the Russian suzerainty prior to 1685, and




Tsar that he was interested in a peaceful settlement to the
dispute. The next several months were characterized by
inaction on the part of both sides, and a sort of 17th
century "sitzkrieg" ensued. The Chinese were obviously the
stronger of the two, and, though the emperor was not
inclined to continue military action, he was adamant that
negotiations with the Russians be undertaken under the most
favorable conditions. The war was now over, and the first
peace treaty between the Russians and Chinese was in
development
.
D. THE TREATY OF NERCHINSK
This treaty, negotiated and concluded in August 1689
under conditions of Chinese military superiority, was
China's first treaty with a European power and was a
diplomatic triumph for China. Also, the treaty served as a
distinct dividing point between the first two periods in
Russian-Chinese relations. The first of these periods was
the military hostilities between the two states detailed
above, while what was to follow could be characterized as a
- Ibid, p. 139. By the time the siege was lifted less
sixty-six men of the Russian garrison of several hundred troops
were still alive.
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period of accommodation.- Thus the realm of diplomatic
relations between Russia and China was ushered in. From
now on the two powers would have the opportunity to work out
their disputes peacefully through conflict avoidance, rather
than direct action on the battlefield.
Given the overwhelming military superiority of the
Chinese in the area, one might wonder why the Chinese did
not take the opportunity to force the Russians all the way
back to Yakutsk. The reason may have been that the Chinese
(specifically the C'hing dynasty Manchus) not only had to
face rebellion within China itself, but also because of the
rise of other foreign powers elsewhere along their borders.
A tribe known as the Jungars were rising in power in central
and western Mongolia and causing instability in Inner Asia.
This region was much farther to the west and closer to
Russian lines of supply and communications, and therefore it
was much easier for the Russians to influence developments.
The Chinese did not want the Jungars to seek Russian aid in
Mongolia and therefore strengthen Russian power along the
Chinese frontier. As a result, the Chinese brought the
Russians to the bargaining table not only to delineate the
Far Eastern frontier, but also to satisfy the emperor's
-
M Scott, p. 18.
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desire for stability in the Jungar regions. This desire
"impelled the Chinese to seek Russian neutrality in Inner
Asia and impinged directly and immediately on both
delegations to the meetings."
The most obvious cause of conflict between the two
powers was the frontier over which they had been fighting
for the past several decades was not clearly defined. Due
to the fact that neither side had permanently inhabited the
area for any significant period of time, there was no
accurate geographical survey of the region. As far as
claims of ownership of the region, Russia claimed the Amur
"by right of colonization." The Chinese lay claim to the
Amur region because the local tribes were vassals to the
C'hing dynasty and paid tribute to them. Their contention
was that it was not necessary for the Chinese themselves to
actually inhabit the area for it to be Chinese territory.
After lengthy negotiations, the final treaty ended up
-"Mancall, p. 141. The negotiations were dominated by the
problems the Russians and Chinese faced from their very first
contact: delineation of the frontier, the return of fugitives,
the conduct of trade, and the creation of institutions for the
development of future relations.
"Ibid, p. 142. The claim to new territory by 'right of
colonization' was currently in vogue as the European powers began




being more or less fair to both sides. The western portion
of the frontier in question was drawn between Nerchinsk,
which was to remain under the control of the Russians, and
Albazin.' The remainder of the frontier east of Albazin
was to extend roughly along a line formed by the Yabloni
mountain range east to the Sea of Okhotsk. Even though
there was no precise demarcation of the border, the Russians
were forced to withdraw entirely from the Priamorye area.
Even though there had been sporadic trade going on
between the two powers since their first contact, the
Nerchinsk Treaty further opened the door to trade. The
trade relationship after the signing of this treaty did not
develop to the degree that both parties would have liked,
however, due to bureaucratic obstacles set up by the
Chinese.'- This trade situation continued to deteriorate
until formalized in the Treaty of Kyakhta in 1727. From
this point on the relationship between Russia and China was
supposed to be peaceful in nature, and trade was to flourish
'•Albazin was, however, not to be occupied by either side.
Instructions were issued for the complete destruction of this
outpost and the return of all Russians, their property, and
military equipment to the Russian side of the frontier.
'-Mancall, p. 200. The Chinese attempted to secure a state
monopoly on trade and restrict trade routes, limited to caravans,




to the benefit of both sides. The first section of the
Kyakhta Treaty stipulates:
This new treaty was especially concluded so that
the peace between both empires might be stronger
and eternal. And from this day each government
must rule and control its own subjects, and,
greatly respecting the peace, each must gather and
restrain its own so that they do not provoke any
harmful affair .
'
In addition to this, formal inspection and delineation
of the border was undertaken under the auspices of the
Kyakhta Treaty. The Russians and Chinese went to great
lengths to accurately determine the proper demarcation of
the region and to stipulate the rules and regulations for
the proper conduct of trade. It is obvious, after reading
the text of the treaty, that there was a great deal of
importance placed on these particular issues.' 4 Following
the conclusion of this treaty, there existed a long period
of peace and stability between the two empires. This peace
and stability would eventually come to an end, however, as
the Russians, along with other European powers, took
advantage of a declining and decaying Chinese Empire in the
"Mancall, p. 302. Taken from the direct translation of the
Treaty of Kyakhta, 21 October 1727.
"Sections III and IV deal specifically with border
demarcation, while sections V through X deal with the




III. THE TREATIES OF AIGUN AND PEKING
A. RUSSIA ACQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAR EASTERN TERRITORY
Throughout the following 130 years, the development of
the Amur region went very slowly. The Russians were
forbidden to settle or work the area and reportedly all the
Chinese did was "to settle the southern bank of the Amur
River while the north remained no man's land."'
Additionally, by the mid-nineteenth century the Russians
were experiencing a great deal of trouble with the further
development of their other Siberian possessions. The
limiting factors were a lack of communications, a harsh
climate, and the difficulty in obtaining supplies and
provisions. These problems led the Russians to consider the
"advisability of acquiring the Amur River valley, despite
the treaties with China."" The goal was to improve
communications with the Pacific regions and that food for
future settlements could be grown.
At this time the Manchu Empire was in a position of
'"Alexander Preobrazhensky, "Our Far East: Origins,"
International Affairs
,
East View Publications, September 9, 1993,
p. 81.
'"Barbara, Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy:
1814-1914
, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964, p. 163.
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great weakness. It had lost a great deal of strength, both
military and diplomatic, as a result of the Opium War (1839-
1842). Subsequent fighting with the British and French, who
were trying to expand their own empires in Asia, not only
left China weak, but gave the Russians the opportunity to
'slip in through the back door, ' and take advantage of the
situation. For her part, Russia had suffered serious losses
in the Crimean War (1854), which had temporarily halted
Russian imperial expansion in Europe. Since they could not
advance in Europe, or into Central Asia (the 'Great Game'
with Britain was underway in this area) , the Russians
decided to take control of the Amur region.
This new energetic, aggressive, and expansionist policy
was capped off in 1847 by the appointment of Count Nicholai
Nikolaevich Muraviev as governor-general of Eastern Siberia.
Muraviev, without consulting his superiors in St.
Petersburg, set south and began exploration of the region
and the establishment of outposts. By 1854 Muraviev was
sending flotillas down the Amur River from the Russian
frontier deep into what had for the last century been
considered Chinese territory.' Shortly thereafter, in
1
Al stair Lamb, Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing
Problem , Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968, p. 206.
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flagrant violation of the Nerchinsk Treaty, a Russian
outpost was established at Khabarovsk at the junction of the
Amur and Ussuri rivers. Another outpost, the port of
Nikolaevsk (named in honor of Tsar Nicholas), was set up
near the mouth of the Amur River. The violation of Chinese
territory was protested, but the Tsar replied to the Chinese
that, "where the Russian flag has once been hoisted, it must
not be lowered.
"
The aggressive Muraviev continued his push into the
Amur region and sent three additional expeditions down the
river, each larger than the preceding one. China lodged
objections to the expeditions, each time without avail.'
In March 1855 the Russian expansion was temporarily halted
as Muraviev returned to Russia following the death of the
Tsar. He subsequently returned to the Amur region, this time
in the name of Tsar Alexander. Officially, Russia insisted
that China cede the region, while China insisted the
boundaries should remain as they were.
In May 1858 Muraviev was once again prepared to take
full advantage of the crisis situation created by the




trouble in southern China. Muraviev cajoled, threatened,
and "completed a masterful job of aggression that would have
done credit to Stalin or Krushchev."" Even though the
Russians forced the Chinese to the negotiating table without
actually doing battle, Muraviev backed up his threats of
military force by firing cannons at night into Chinese
territory. Muraviev subsequently met with Chinese
representatives on the middle reach of the Amur. 4 - Here he
succeeded in securing Chinese recognition of the Russian
claim to the north bank of the Amur River eastward to its
junction with the Ussuri River. It was further agreed that
the territory between the Ussuri River and the Pacific Ocean
should be considered to be jointly owned until its final
disposition could be settled at a later time.
Thus the Treaty of Aigun was signed 28 May 1858 by
Muraviev and a local Chinese official (who was not
authorized to conclude an agreement of this magnitude)
,
which legalized Russia's conquests. China was to cede more
4 Ibid.
4:Mark Mancall, "Russia and China: The Structure of
Contact, " Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on
the Asian Peoples / Hoover Institution Press, 1972, p. 322.
In 1853 the Tsar granted Muraviev sovereign powers to
carry on diplomatic negotiations in the Far East without
reference to the Foreign Ministry in St. Petersburg.
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than 185,000 square miles of territory which had been
recognized as Chinese. China refused to ratify the treaty
and repudiated it a year later, however, they were far too
weak to actively resist the Russians.
In 1860, the Chinese situation vis-a-vis France and
Great Britain was desperate. Anglo-French forces had fought
their way into Peking and the Russians, in a brilliant
diplomatic move of playing both sides against each other,
succeeded in having Nicholas Pavlovich Ignatiev appointed as
a mediator in the dispute. Ignatiev played the role not
only of mediator between the Chinese and the Anglo-French
forces, but also negotiated a land settlement in favor of
the Russians, and at the expense of the Chinese. Ignatiev
was very deceitful in his actions and literally tricked the
Chinese out of the land in question. He also made the
Anglo-French forces believe that a large Russian military
expedition was poised and ready to support them.
Ignatiev double-crossed the Chinese and the French
and British. He told the Western Powers that
Russia had stopped her military mission for fear
that Russian guns would be used against Anglo-
French troops. This of course was a lie, since it
was China and not Russia who had blocked the
mission. He told the 'French that the fall of the
Manchus would cripple trade, which was at least
debatable. And he suggested to the French and the
British that it would facilitate negotiations if
they removed their troops from Peking, which they
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had captured in October 1860. When this
suggestion was followed, Ignatiev then told the
Chinese that Russia had compelled the Western
Powers to withdraw. So successful did Ignatiev
operate that both the French and the Chinese asked
him to mediate. He did so, the price to China
being the Treaty of Peking, which gave to Russia
all the land between the right bank of the Ussuri
river and the sea (the Maritime Province)
.
Complete freedom of frontier trade was also
established. : -
Thus, the Treaty of Peking, was signed in November 1860
and compelled China to cede an additional 130,000 square
miles of territory (later to be called the Maritime Krai) to
Russia, and reaffirmed the validity of the Treaty of
Aigun.' Thus, in just two years, through threats and
deceit, Russia gained over 380,000 square miles of
territory, including the major port city of Vladivostok
('master of the sea') without having to go to war. Russia
now had over 1,500 miles of additional coastline, and ice-
free access to the Pacific.
After three centuries, Peter the Great's ambition for
an outlet on the open sea had been realized. Russia had now
acquired a legal right not only to the country north of the
Amur and east of the Ussuri, but also the entire coast of
Bray, p. 50.
''Lamb, p . 2 07 .
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Manchuria, with its magnificent bays and harbors."
Russia's expansion and interference in the region was not at
an end, however, and there were those in Russia who did not
see the Amur-Ussuri line as the final, logical boundary
between the two states. The Manchu Empire was still in
rapid decline and, following the Sino- Japanese war of 1895,
the whole of Manchuria and Korea "appeared to be within the
grasp of Russia, whose power in the Far East, as the Trans-
Siberian railway neared completion, was steadily
increasing. " 4;
B. THE INTERIM YEARS
The years following the Aigun and Peking treaties were
characterized by upheaval. In 1898, the Russians obtained a
twenty-five year lease (in reality it was nothing more than
outright annexation) of the Manchurian city of Port Arthur
and about 1,300 square miles of the southern Manchurian
Liaotung. Russia was on the move once again, adding vast
expanses of territory to its empire. The Russians, in





weakness, exploited the opportunity provided by the 1900
Boxer Rebellion in China to occupy the remainder of
Manchuria. Russians continued to expand apace, however,
this time they ran into an equally expansive foe- the
Japanese. A war ensued in which Russia was dealt a severe
defeat and pushed out of Manchuria and back to their 1860
lines . ~'
Following World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution of
1917, the Russian Empire again turning toward Europe.
During the first few years after the revolution, there were,
however, a number of Soviet leaders who were still paying
close attention to events in Asia. Some of these leaders
"doubted the morality of Russia's continuing to enjoy the
fruits of Tsarist expansion at the expense of the
Chinese." 4 As a result in 1919 the Soviets announced, in
the Karakhan Declaration, that they were hereby declaring
void all Tsarist treaties with China and renounced the
seizure and occupation of Chinese territory which had been
"ravenously" taken from them by the Tsar's government.
What actually transpired, however, was completely
different. An agreement, completed in 1924 between Russia
' Lamb, p. 2 09.
47Lamb, p. 209.
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Ln i China for the redemarcation of the Sino-Russian border,
• ually stipulated that the existing boundaries would be
maintained.
The next major event in the Manchurian sector was the
creation of the Japanese puppet state of Manchuoko. A
treaty between the Soviets and the Japanese during the early
stages of World War II ensured that the boundaries
established in 1924 would remain in tact. This situation
was changed in August 1945 when the Soviets invaded
Manchuria and defeated the Japanese Kwangtung Army, thereby
ending the war in China. Even though there were substantial
numbers of Soviet troops in Manchuria for several years,
World War II did not result in lasting acquisition of
Chinese territory by the Soviets. 4 " The Soviets, however,
subsequently occupied all of Manchuria between 1945 and
1946, holding it until after the defeat of the Chinese
Nationalists by Mao Tse Tung and the Communists in 1949."
The ten years following the Communist take-over in
4
"Lamb, p. 209. This notwithstanding, the Soviets did
manage to continue their Far Eastern expansion by taking the
southern portion of Sakhalin Island. This part of the island had
previously been under Japanese suzeriegnty by the decree of the
Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.
"'Lamb, p. 209. The Soviets, however, did keep troops
stationed in Port Arthur until 1954.
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China saw an alliance between the Soviet Union and the newly
formed People's Republic of China. The closeness and
cooperation between these two communist giants was short
lived, however, and relations between the two quickly
deteriorated. Thus the stage is set for the upcoming Sino-
Soviet rift and the fighting along the border in 1969.
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IV. BUILDING UP TO THE 196 9 BORDER CONFLICT
A. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
Up to this point this paper has outlined the basis for
the border dispute between the Chinese and Russians in the
Amur Region. This section of the dispute will focus on the
events from 1947 onward that lead up to the 1969
confrontation, which threatened for the first time open
warfare between the USSR and the PRC over what seemed to be
an insignificant "tiny island." A partial explanation for
the Sino-Soviet border confrontation of 1969 is based on
three separate but closely related elements:
1. Peking demanded that the Russo-Chinese border
treaties of 1858 and 1860 be declared "unequal" by the
USSR.
2. Specific areas declared "in dispute" by the PRC
along the Amur-Ussuri rivers, which the USSR refused to
recognize
.
3. The recurring Chinese demand for the withdrawal of
forces Soviet from the Sino-Soviet Border.
David Rebs, "Soviet Border Problems: China and Japan,"
Conflict Studies , No. 139, 1982, pp. 4-5.
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The border incident of 1969 did not erupt spontaneously
but was fueled by a series of other border incidents that
parallelled the downward course of Sino-Soviet/Russian
relations. For nearly a decade after the formation of the
communist PRC in 1947, border relations between the two
regional powers were considered amicable. In fact, in 1949,
during negotiations leading to the eventual Sino-Soviet
treaty, Mao Tse-tung stated no more unequal treaties existed
between the USSR and the PRC. The two states respected each
others territory and signed in 1950 the Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. - But in 1954,
Chairman Mao brought up the issue of the Outer Mongolian
border in a meeting with Khrushchev, who refused to discuss
the matter. Another attempt was made by Zhou En-Lie in
1957 when Khrushchev visited Peking, but there was still no
"satisfactory answer." ~ Starting in 1959, Moscow began
reporting a series of border incidents and provocations by
Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute:
Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes," The




, p . 6
"
4Robinson, p. 1177.
the Chinese. Overall, relations between the two powers were
on the decline and,
in retrospect, it is apparent that border
difficulties were an indicator of that decline and
an important factor in Sino-Soviet relations as a
whole during the next decade [1960s].
Rhetoric from the PRC and USSR also began to reflect
the growing animosity over the border issue. In July 1964,
the PRC severely criticized the Soviet Union for its
"territorial ambitions, " and said "there are too many
places occupied by the Soviet Union including the Amur
region." Moscow replied to the PRC ' s comments in the 2
September 1964 edition of Pravda by accusing Mao of "an
openly expansionist program with far reaching
pretensions." Just prior to these verbal attacks Moscow
suggested to China that the two begin secret negotiations
about the border dispute.
These secret consultations were intended to serve as a
Ibid, p. 1177
Ibid, p. 1177
' Rebs, p. 6. Thomas Robinson believes the situation could
have become worse in 1964 had not Khrushchev been removed from
power as the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Mao
charged that the Soviets had been concentrating troops along the
border during this time. Robinson, p. 1179.
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precursor, preparing the way for a precise determination of
the boundary. The consultations began in earnest on 25
February 1964 and were meant to set the stage for further
negotiations if enough progress was made. The Russians
stated an agreement was reached "in principle" and that the
proposed "talks" stage would begin October 15, 1964 in
Moscow. The Chinese, however, did not respond to a note
from the USSR dated September 26, 1964 inviting their
diplomats to the table. 58
The main points under contention in these secret
negotiations of 1964 were based on the procedures which
would be used to delineate the border:
1. The Chinese wanted the Soviets to admit the
inequality of the old treaties before they would sign
or even negotiate a new treaty. If the Russians would
denounce these treaties, the Chinese would move rapidly
to negotiate a new treaty. The Chinese further stated
they would also consider the old treaties in the new
agreement
.
2. The Soviet Union proposed to initiate a new treaty
'Robinson, p. 1179.
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and then annul the old ones. The Soviets distrusted
the Chinese proposal described above. They thought the
Chinese would back away from their promise of taking
the old treaties into account.
3. As noted earlier in this paper, the Chinese based
their case on the border dispute solely on the claim of
invalidity of the "unequal treaties." But when
international law is taken into account we find there
are two cases. On the one hand, the Chinese contention
states "conditions have changed and the old treaties
are no longer valid, " and on the other, the Soviets
argued that "treaties retain their validity until
explicitly altered by the treaty signatories." By
delineation of the law, the judgment should go toward
the Soviet argument. But in the world of "power




4. The Chinese also had one more point of contention
with the Soviets. China claimed that according to the
Thalweg argument, river boundaries "must follow the
Ibid, p. 1180.
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deepest points of the river channel." The Chinese
asserted that most of the riverine islands under Soviet
occupation actually belonged to them because of the
Thalweg principle. The USSR adamantly refuted this
claim.
Whatever the argument posed by either side, one thing
remained clear after these failed negotiations:
confrontation along the Amur region border was becoming more
and more inevitable. In April 1966, the Chinese issued a
set of "Regulations Governing Foreign Vessels on Rivers on
the National Boundary" for no apparent reason. This marked
the final collapse of the cooperation between the Soviet
Union and the PRC on the development of the Amur and Ussuri
river regions. The 1966 "Regulations" in effect, made all
river traffic abide by Chinese rules such as examination of
all ships, applications for permission to navigate the
rivers, and requiring vessels to fly the PRC flag on the
foremast while sailing along these rivers.' No reason was
ever given by the Chinese government for unilaterally
declaring these regulations. In effect, if the Soviet Union
Ibid, p. 1181
"Regulations Governing Foreign Vessels on Rivers on the
National Boundary," NCNA , April 19, 1966.
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agreed to these regulations they would "automatically have
lost all sovereignty along the riverine borders with
China."
Starting in 1967, the Soviets accused the Chinese of
wildly provocative behavior along the Ussuri and /Amur river
regions. These incidents included the Chinese provoking
fights and driving across Soviet territory in cars and
trucks attempting to run down Soviet border guards.
The Chinese claimed the Soviets started violating their
borders at about the same time. From January 1967 to March
2, 1969, the Chinese reported that Soviet troops intruded
countless times on their "riverine islands." Some of the
Chinese accusations against the Soviets included "ramming
Chinese fishing boats, turning high pressure hoses on them,
"
and assaulting and wounding Chinese frontier guards." The
Chinese government also accused the Soviets of driving out
"many Chinese inhabitants by force, demolishing their
houses, and destroying their means of production and
household goods."'" Moreover, the Chinese said the Soviets
"provoked" 4,189 border incidents from the breakdown of
Robinson, p. 1182.
'Ibid, p. 1182.
; Ibid, pp. 1182-1183.
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border negotiations in 1964 to the conflict in March 1969.
What can be seen up to the border clash of March 1969
is a vicious circle of tit-for-tat violations between two
unfriendly regional superpowers "who disagreed upon some
specifics of border demarcation and who found the border a
convenient place to express the general tension."' On
March 2, 1969 this vicious circle would turn for the worse
and put these powers on the brink of war.
B. THE BORDER CLASH
On a frozen winter night of March 2, 1969 a mixed group
of three hundred Chinese frontier guards and soldiers of the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), dressed in snow camouflage,
crossed from the Chinese side of the frozen Ussuri River to
Damansky Island. This uninhabited island, situated on the
Sino-Soviet border was the territory of the Soviet Union.
The Chinese also had claims to this island, which was known
to them as Chen Pao . The Chinese soldiers, under cover of
'Ibid, p. 1183.
Ibid, p. 1183.
"Harold C. Hinton, The Sino-Soviet Confrontation
Implications for the Future
,
New York, Crane, Russak and Company
Inc., 1976, p. 16.
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darkness, dug in and set up a command post on the island.
Meanwhile, on the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River, numerous
reserves and additional firepower were getting into position
by deploying antitank guns, grenade launchers, mortars, and
heavy machine guns. The stage was being set for an
ambush.
On the morning of 2 March, the Soviet Border guards
noticed activity on the Chinese bank as a group of about
thirty Chinese soldiers began moving toward the island
chanting Maoist slogans. As was the usual case, the Soviet
guards approached the Chinese and demanded their immediate
withdrawal, a request to which the Chinese usually obliged.
But in this case things would be different. The Chinese
without warning, quickly pulled machine guns, which were
hidden under their coats, and mowed down the Soviet troops
which had been completely caught off guard. At the same
time the three hundred Chinese soldiers hidden on Damansky
Island ambushed another Soviet border guard unit as they
attempted to help their comrades who were under attack. In
the melee which followed, (according to Soviet sources),
Soviet reinforcements from the Damansky Border garrison
b80. B. Borisov and B.T. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations,
1945-1970
, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1975,
p. 323.
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raced to the scene and subsequently forced the Chinese to
retreat from Damans ky Island back into Chinese territory.
This entire confrontation lasted approximately two hours.
Both sides claimed victory, but "neither the Russian nor
Chinese forces remained permanently on the island after the
battle was over."
C. THE SECOND CONFRONTATION
The March 15 border skirmish differed greatly from the
previously described skirmish on March 2 in that both sides
were at a heightened state of alert, forces were much
larger, and the element of surprise was absent. While both
capitals were staging protest in the form of communiques and
demonstrations, forces along the Sino-Soviet border,
especially around Damansky Island, were poised for combat.
When the action finally started, it would be difficult to
judge who began the hostilities.
After the first attack on March 2, the Soviets
increased the frequency of their patrols around the island
but did not station a permanent force, because it would have
been easy for the Chinese to zero-in with artillery
'Robinson, pp. 1188-1189.
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bombardment. From Soviet information it was reported that
on the night of the 15th, a small Soviet scouting party
spent the night on the island and may have been used as bait
provoke a Chinese assault. The Chinese have stated that the
•"other side sent many tanks to the island at about 4:00 a.m.
on the 15th attacking Chinese guards on patrol." The
Soviet version stated their early morning patrol discovered
a group of Chinese that had dug in overnight.
Whatever the initial cause, the battle began in
earnest around 9:45 or 10:00 a.m., with mortar and
artillery from the Chinese bank. By 10:30,
according to Soviet account, heavy fire from three
points on the Chinese bank.
When this initial barrage of artillery began, the
Chinese sent a regiment consisting of over two thousand men
on a mad dash across the ice and took possession of part of
the island. When the Soviets realized they were confronting
a force superior in manpower, they pulled back their machine
guns and armored personnel carriers to the eastern side of
the island. The Chinese used suppressive artillery fire in




the Soviet side of the river. The Soviets allowed the
Chinese to advance and then used a tactic that the American
Army had used successfully against the Chinese in Korea.
With the Chinese in the open during their charge, the
Soviets opened up with tanks, armored personnel carriers,
and heavy machine guns. Also, artillery was used
effectively by the Soviets in order to hit key targets up to
four miles inland. It took three attacks by the Soviets to
finally drive the Chinese off the island/ As one Soviet
source put it: "There was nothing left of the Chinese but
their belt buckles." 4 Casualties reported by both sides
were sixty Soviets dead, eight hundred Chinese dead or
wounded. All this death and destruction over a uninhabited,
frozen island on the Sino-Soviet border would, fortunately,
not degenerate into full scale warfare.
-This was a tactic whereby the advancing force, which
typically was much larger and positioned in a 'human wave'
formation, was allowed to penetrate the defensive lines for a
short distance before a massive counterstroke was unleashed.
"Ibid, p. 1190.
"
4 Hinton, p. 17.
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V. MOVING FORWARD TOWARD NORMALIZED RELATIONS
A . OVERVIEW
The border conflict of March 1969 did not escalate into
general warfare between the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China largely because of the Soviets' threat of
a nuclear strike against China. After several months of
both intimated and open threats of a Soviet nuclear missile
strike against China's nuclear facilities, the Chinese were
cowed and agreed to come to the bargaining table and the end
of 1969. What followed was years of fruitless negotiations
punctuated by intermittent agreements, more often than not
on minor, seemingly insignificant issues.
Years of intransigence and frustration finally took its
toll and in 1978 the talks were once again broken off. It
appeared for a time that the relationship between the USSR
and the PRC would slip backward into the dark days of the
early sixties. This, however, did not happen and through
mutual compromise both sides were back at the negotiating
table toward the end of 1979.
The next stepping stone was the de-linkage of the
border issue from normalized relations, the Chinese demand
for settlement of the Three obstacles, and Mikhail
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Gorbachev's landmark July 1986 Vladivostok speech. This
speech clearly marked a new phase in Sino-Soviet relations
and continues today in the wake of the dissolution of the
Soviet Union.
B. AFTERMATH OF THE BORDER CONFLICT
The clashes of March 2 and March 15 were not the only
large scale shooting incidents to happen in the Amur-Ussuri
basin in 1969. Over the course of the next several months,
additional engagements between the Soviets and the Chinese
took place. Aggressive patrolling by both sides lead to a
series of firefights which ensued in March, April, May, June
and August, alternating between the disputed islands in the
Amur and Ussuri border rivers to the east and the Xinjiang-
Central Asian border to the west.
The Soviets' aim was to convince the Chinese that they
were willing and able to escalate the conflict. The Soviet
goal was to intimidate the Chinese and thereby bring about a
swift conclusion to the fighting along the border. The
Soviets went about this by a variety of means:
Rodger Swearingen, Siberia and the Soviet Far East:
Strategic Dimensions in Multinational Perspective , Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, p
189.
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1 . Behavior in subsequent border encounters was
characterized by the Soviets' use of heavy weapons
(artillery and rockets), demonstrating a willingness to
use higher levels of force than in previous encounters.
2
.
Soviet troop reinforcements moving into the border
area was "discreetly advertised" by foreign visitors
and journalists who were allowed to observe the
process
.
3. Iterated repeated reminders to the Chinese of past
occasions when the Soviet Union had engaged in combat
in the Far East.
a. the 1938 fighting at Khalkin-Gol (near the
Manchuria-Mongolia-Soviet border) against the Japanese
b. the Soviet rout of the Japanese Kwangtung army
in 1945, at the end of the Second World War. Chief of
General Staff Marshal Zakharov, in an article entitled
"An Instructive Lesson, " recalled the "two converging
strikes" into Manchuria which quickly defeated the
Japanese. the Marshal went on to state that this
"'Ibid, p. 190.
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4. In addition to the reminders of previous large-scale
Soviet conventional warfare in the Far East, the Soviet
leadership tried to convince the Chinese that there was
"a real possibility of nuclear attack." 78
In order to convince the Chinese that a nuclear strike
could be forthcoming, the Soviets endeavored to minimize the
political risk, i.e. international criticism, of openly
announcing they would initiate a nuclear attack upon the
PRC, by conveying the possibility of just such an attack
through innuendo and implication. In an obvious move to
gain international sanction for a nuclear attack against
China, the Soviets even tried to involve the United States.
This is not to say the Soviets hoped the United States would
join in an attack on the PRC, but would, upon being
notified, inform the Chinese as to Soviet intentions.
Toward this end, on 18 August 1969 a Soviet Embassy official








On 16 September 1969, in the London Evening News, the
Soviets made their most direct and detailed threat of a
nuclear attack against China. This article cited,
well informed sources in Moscow as asserting that
Russian nuclear installations stand aimed at the
Chinese nuclear facilities and that the Soviet
Union prefers using rockets to manpower in
responding to border clashes. The USSR has a
variety of rockets to choose from, that the
Soviets have a plan to launch an air attack on Lop
Nor and that whether or not the Soviet Union will
dare attack Lop Nor is a question of strategy, and
so the world will learn of it afterwards.'"
C. RESOLUTION AND RESULTS OF THE 1969 BORDER
CRISIS
Due to the various threats and intimations made by the
Soviet Union in the months following the fighting along the
border, the Chinese were in fact intimidated. In
particular, the threat of a nuclear strike on the PRC made a
"""Ibid, pp. 191-192. The Soviet plan worked as they had
intended. The United States did not support the Soviet move, but
did, on 27 August 1969, make an announcement to diplomatic





deep impression on the Chinese leadership. From May 1969
and on, the Chinese made repeated reference in both official
and unofficial statements to Soviet nuclear blackmail, the
targeting of missiles against China and of the potential for
a surprise Soviet nuclear attack.'-
A meeting between premiers Zhou En Lai and Kosygin in
Beijing in September 1969 helped to bring about a reduction
in aggressive patrols by both the Chinese and Soviets along
their common Far Eastern border and a resumption of the
border talks which had been previously broken off in 1964.
The resumption of talks, which were to be held on a bi-
annual basis in Moscow, in October 1969 served, at the
outset, only as a new forum in which the Chinese were able
to express their charges of territorial thievery against the
Soviet Union. Additionally, the Soviet Far Eastern military
buildup and the threat of a nuclear attack also became
sticking points in the border negotiation process. The
Chinese even went so far as to demand the total withdrawal
of Soviet military forces from territory claimed by the PRC
yl Ibid, p. 193. References to Soviet nuclear blackmail were
released by the PRC government in a number of forms, to include
government statements and newspapers. In one such journal, the
Chinese stated that if a handful of warmongers dare raid China's
strategic sites, that would be war and the Chinese people would
rise up in resistance.
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as rightfully Chinese. "-
These bi-annual meetings in Moscow continued for years
with very little progress having been made. Both sides did
manage, however, to bring about an increase in cross-border
trade, and the Soviets offered to accept, in 1973, the
thalweg to demarcate the riverine boundaries. Additionally,
both sides agreed to "accept the status quo on the border
until exact boundary locations could be mutually
accepted."^ This notwithstanding, the Chinese maintained
their intransigent stance on the issue of the "unequal
treaties." The Soviets became exasperated at the Chinese
stance and the relationship between the two began to
deteriorate yet again. Thus, border talks were broken off
at the Spring 1978 session. Table 5.1 shows, in brief, a
compilation of dates and results of Sino-Soviet border talks
held over a period of nine years.
To make matters worse, in January 1979 the Chinese
attacked Vietnam, a Soviet ally, in response to the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia the previous December. Not
to be outdone, in December 1979 the Soviets invaded
32Ibid, p. 194. This demand was subsequently dropped.
"Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its
International Implications , 1945-1990, University of Washington
Press, 1992, p. 69.
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Afghanistan, as result of which was to leave the Chinese
with a renewed sense of being surrounded and isolated by a
powerful, hostile Soviet Union. Events reached their nadir
when on April 2, 1979 Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua
announced to the Soviet ambassador to China that his
government had "decided not to extend the Sino-Soviet treaty
beyond its expiration on the grounds that the international
situation had changed drastically.""" The Chinese did not,
apparently, put much stock in Leonid Brezhnev's January 1979
warning to the Chinese that if they decided to "abrogate the




The Chinese did not, however, seek to sever ties with
the Soviets completely. In the same announcement of the
intention not to renew the Sino-Soviet treaty, the Chinese
offered to engage the Soviets in talks "on a separate basis
from those on the border."" The Soviets agreed to this
" 4 Ibid. The expiration date set for the treaty was April
11, 1980.
35Ibid. The Chinese were likely emboldened by the opening
of diplomatic relations with the United States in the beginning
of 1979 to the point where they could afford to push for getting
their way vis-a-vis the USSR.
"Ibid. The Soviets promptly accepted this proposal (17
April 1979) , with both sides agreeing to suspend the deadlocked
border talks in favor of focusing on the normalization of
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proposal and as a result, talks opened in Moscow at the
vice-ministerial level on September 27, 1979. A significant
difference between the new normalization talks and the
previous border talks was that following the initial meeting
in Moscow, the talks were to be held on an alternating basis
in both Beijing and Moscow.




January to April 1970
Talks convened under
duress. PRC demands prior
acknowledgement of "unequal
treaties" and "disputed
areas, " proposing mutual
withdrawal of border forces
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territorial compromise,
including acceptance of the

















Rehashing of old arguments.
No progress made.




PRC tacitly drops claims to
"unequal" status of
treaties, agrees to sign
nonaggression pact if
Soviets agree to mutal
withdrawal from disputed
areas. USSR refuses.
No progress. Soviet border
violation in Xingjiang
center of discussions.
Deaths of Mao Tse Tung and
Zhou En Lai. USSR suggests
partial settlement and
suspension of polemics. PRC
refuses
"Heated" talks broken off
by mutual consent.
D PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION
The newly commenced normalization talks got off to a
rocky start. The Chinese, who had agreed to enter into
negotiations without any preconditions, immediately raised
three demands: 1) Reduction of Soviet troops along the PRC-
USSR border, 2) Soviet aid to Vietnam and Vietnamese troops
out of Cambodia, and 3) Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
These later became known as the Three [Fundamental]
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Obstacles. The Chinese insisted that these Three Obstacles
be directly linked to the normalization of economic and
cultural relations, whereas the Soviets were interested in
proceeding with normalization without respect to acceding to
the Chinese demands. This differing stance on the issues,
coupled with the Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan resulted in the talks being put off until the
fall of 1982.
With the resumption of talks, the Chinese eventually
acquiesced and agreed to the Soviets' demanding the Three
Obstacles be de-linked from establishing and expanding
economic and cultural ties. During the course of the next
six years, there would be a total of fourteen rounds of
vice-ministerial talks, held on a bi-annual basis in Moscow
and Beijing." Despite lack of real progress with regard to
the Three Obstacles the two sides slowly, but steadily
improved their bilateral relations. 1986 was clearly the
watershed year marking the beginning of Chinese-
Soviet/Russian relations in the modern era. March 1986 saw
the opening of the Sino-Soviet Committee on Economics,
Trade, Scientific and Technical Cooperation whereby both
Dittmer, p. 70. The even-numbered sessions were held in
Moscow and the odd-numbered sessions in Beijing.
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sides would exchange experience on economic planning and
development. In addition, the Chinese opened a consulate in
Leningrad and the Soviets one in Shanghai. Also, in a move
which clearly indicated to the Chinese that the Soviets were
willing to make concessions on the Three Obstacles, Mikhail
Gorbachev delivered his now famous July 1986 Vladivostok
speech
.
A year later, border talks, which had been broken off
eight years earlier, were reopened at the vice-ministerial
level in Moscow February 9-23, 1987. "' Both sides agreed to
begin demarcation of the long border, starting in the east.
These talks continue to the present day, and will be
discussed more thoroughly in Chapter VI.
E . CONCLUSION
The Chinese were at first suspicious of Gorbachev's
pronouncements, though within two years of the Vladivostok
speech the Soviets had "basically" removed all Three
Obstacles."' Improvements in overall relations continued to




ministers exchanged visits, and in May 1989 Gorbachev
visited Beijing. Full diplomatic relations are now in place
between Moscow and Beijing, the Tienanmen Square massacre
and fall of the Soviet Union notwithstanding. Russian
President Boris Yeltsin has visited Beijing, and Chinese
President Jiang Zemin has visited Moscow on several
occasions. In a recent move, Zemin travelled to Moscow in
October 1994, and while there signed a joint Chinese-Russian
document proclaiming an end to hostility between the two
states, and pledged they would no longer target nuclear
missiles or use force against each other.
This latest visit and the signing of the document is
yet another step toward complete and amicable diplomatic
relations between Moscow and Beijing. There are, however, a
number of considerable political differences which remain.
For example, the Chinese still see Yelstin as a traitor to
communism and that the Russian political and economic
reforms are a mistake. For their part, the 'democratic'
Russian politicians see the Chinese regime as unduly
repressive
.
Additional problems, which while they will not likely
in and of themselves cause a dramatic shift in the current
Sino-Russian diplomatic trend, could, taken together, grow
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in importance and directly effect the nature of relations
between the two. These problems, which include continued
intransigence, on both sides, with regard to border
demarcation, and mass immigration, will be addressed in




RUSSIAN-CHINESE FAR EASTERN BORDER DEMARCATION
A. OVERVIEW
Mikhail Gorbachev's several years of trying to solve
the Sino-Soviet border dispute and thereby improve relations
between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China
(PRO finally bore fruit in early 1991, a mere three months
before the August coup attempt. On May 16, 1991 a pact, in
which the issues of border demarcation were to be addressed
and resolved over a period of several years, was signed in
Moscow. The signatories of the pact were Russian
President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese Communist Party
leader Jiang Zemin, who was on his second day of a five day
visit to Moscow. This visit is significant in that it was
the first such contact between the two communist giants
since Mao Tse Tung's 1957 visit with Nikita Khrushchev.'
The pact, the result of three years of border
discussions, was by no means all inclusive and only dealt
with a portion of the 4,600 mile long border separating the
two countries. The documents signed were designed to settle
once and for all the dispute over the Far Eastern border
Facts On File, May, 1991, p. 376
"•Ibid.
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between the eastern portion of outer Mongolia and North
Korea. What must be noted, however, is that a number of
sectors of the border in the Amur Basin, including Damansky
Island, were not covered in the treaty. '- This
notwithstanding, relations between the two were rapidly
improving. Gorbachev, while seeing China as a source of
economic aid, was interested in a more amicable relationship
with China in order to reduce military expenditures and
concentrate on the USSR's economic woes. The Chinese saw a
blossoming relationship with the Soviet Union as being
beneficial toward their position in the. regional balance of
power, and as a source of modern military hardware.
The August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow which deposed
Mikhail Gorbachev also took some of the forward impetus out
of the expanding Soviet-Chinese relationship. Now gone was
the opportunity for a strategic alliance based on, albeit
differing, communist ideals and the desire for a secure
border. The Chinese reaction, or lack thereof, to the coup
also caused a slowdown in their mutual relations. There is
even evidence that Chinese Communist part documents stated
that some hard-line Chinese officials were clearly
'-Ibid.
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disappointed that the coup had failed."
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited
the bulk of the border with China and all that went along
with it. While the opportunity for an alliance had gone by
the way side, the border agreement, which had been signed
the previous May, was subsequently ratified by both the
Russian and Chinese parliaments in February 1992.'" The
ratification documents were then signed by Russian President
Boris Yeltsin and the former Chinese President Yang
Shangkun, and the treaty came into force. Additionally, the
flow of high-tech weaponry from Russia to China was not only
continuing, but expanding as newer and larger deals were
negotiated and signed. Currently the Russians are selling
approximately one billion dollars worth of military hardware
to China on an annual basis. The trade in weapons also
expanded into increased contact between the Chinese and
Russian militaries. During a visit to Beijing in December
1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a memorandum of
understanding "based on the principles of military
"Robert A. Scalapino, "Russia's China Policy," East Asian
Security in the Post-Cold War Era , New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc.,
1993, p. 157.
'^Gerald Segal, "China and the Disintegration of the Soviet
Union," Asian Survey , Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September 1992, p. 856.
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cooperation with China." This document also declared that
Russia is "prepared to cooperate in all sectors, including
the most sophisticated armaments and weapons.""
B. BORDER DEMARCATION EFFORTS
While the broader aspects of Russian-Chinese relations
continued to develop, the Far Eastern Border talks and
demarcation thereof continued, albeit at a slow pace.
Finally, in the spring of 1993, a joint Russian-Chinese
border demarcation commission began the task of surveying
and marking the border.' During previous attempts to
accurately survey and mark the border, Chinese and Russian
specialists made their own measurements separately, at
different times, and using different methods. As of the
spring of 1993, however, both sides made the decision to
"strive for mutual understanding""" with regard to the
,,sHung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an




"Status of Russian-Chinese Far Eastern Border Demarcation
Eyed," 934Q0147B, Moscow, Moscow News , in English, 16 Jul, 1993,




border demarcation. In March 1993, a meeting of the joint
Russian-Chinese border demarcation commission was held in
Khabarovsk. It was at this meeting that the participants
agreed to adhere to begin "practical implementation of the
provisions of the Russian-Chinese Treaty of May 16, 1991 on
demarcation of the border between the two states."
Despite the fact they were working with differing data on
navigable channels and river depths, both sides agreed to,
over a period of approximately five years, "determine the
border line finally in the course of actual demarcation
after joint hydrographical measurements." 1 The task of
demarcating the border was to have begun in April 1993.
Even though agreements were reached and official
documents were signed, the border demarcation work which is
ongoing is not altogether joint, and is not progressing as
smoothly as ideally intended. Certain areas of the border,
specifically in the Amur-Ussuri river basin, are to be left
alone until further negotiations can take place.
Additionally, the portion of the border to be demarcated has
been divided up into ten sectors to be demarcated
independent of each other. This approach therefore has the
"(FBIS-UMA-93-036, JPRS, 29 September 1993, p. 34).
Ibid.
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potential for a lack of coordination between sectors which
can result in a further border complications in the future.
Also, there are those, primarily local residents and
political figures on the Russian side, who are not pleased
with the course of the work and believe the Chinese are
deliberately taking advantage of the current chaos within
Russia to encroach into Russian territory.
C. MOSCOW'S POLICY TOWARD FAR EAST BORDER
DEMARCATION
Based on a review of Russian press reports, it has been
determined that the official Russian policy is supportive of
the demarcation efforts which are underway. However, it
appears that the Russians who have vocalized support for
these efforts are predominantly Moscow-based politicians.
Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Afanseyev, the first deputy head of
the First Directorate of the Asia-Pacific Region at the
Foreign Ministry, is one such politician who has voiced
support for the demarcation efforts. 101 Afanseyev, a self-
"Official Comments on Relations with China," LD1111103893,
Moscow, Ostankino Television First Channel Network , in Russian,
10 Nov, 1993, (FBIS-SOV-93-217 10 Nov, 1993)
.
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proclaimed "orientalist"' stated in an interview that the
demarcation of the border is a simple matter of
international law; that the border runs through the middle
of a river in the case of a non-navigable rivers, or through
the middle of the main channel when the river is
navigable.- If this international principle is adhered to,
then Russia stands to lose control of several islands in the
channel. Afanseyev's stance is that this is a natural
outcome and that some islands will go to China and some to
Russia. He goes on to state,
There is no need for emotion here. It must be
approached with a view to the long-term interests
of Russia and China--namely, to have a stable,
delineated and fair border. That will rule out
any conflict between our two countries and will
create a firm basis for good-neighborliness . I
think we now have quite good prospects for




This is the statement of a high-ranking Russian
politician, and represents the official policies of the
central authorities in Moscow. The attitudes and statements






Russian Far East differ substantially from the official,
foreign policy statements coming from Moscow.
D. REGIONAL RUSSIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FAR EAST
BORDER DEMARCATION
As early as the fall of 1993, Russian press reports
have carried numerous articles in which Russian political
figures who themselves live in the Russian Far East, or
represent the interests of other Russians who do, have
voiced serious concern over how the demarcation of the
border is being carried out. Some have expressed
discontent, opposition and even open hostility to the treaty
of 1991 and the ongoing border demarcation. Once again, a
problem has arisen over the ownership of a few tiny islands
in the Amur and Ussuri rivers- one of which, Damanskiy
Island, was the site of the bitter fighting described in
chapter four. Some press reports have even stated that the
Chinese, in violation of the 1991 treaty, have dumped barge
loads of rubble into the channel near Damanskiy island to
create a "special dike, which has virtually turned the
island into a peninsula." 1 ' The Chinese have therefore
'""Border Demarcation 'Extremely Badly Timed',"
PM0510141793, Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta , in Russian, 05
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"taken away [Damanskiy Island] from Russia apart from any
demarcation effort, with the silent consent of the Russian
leadership."' Another report has charged that the Amur
river is changing it's course, though not in spontaneous
fashion, but "singlemindedly in the direction of the Russian
shore under the influence of artful hydrotechnical structure
set up by the Chinese on their shores.
"
:
These reports, coupled with statements like those made
by a local Cossack leader in the Amur region in which he
protested the, "handover of age-old cossack land to a
neighboring state," have served to keep the demarcation of
the border in the headlines. Local Russian press reports
have run stories lamenting the decision of the Moscow
authorities to allow the demarcation of the border to be
made in accordance with the thalweg principle. The articles
point out to the Russian readers that as a result of the
1991 treaty the border with China is,




~"Chinese-Amur Border Demarcation Issues Reviewed,
"
944F0351B, Khabarovsk, Priamurskiye Vedomostie , in Russian, 01
Feb, 1994, ( FBIS-USR-94-022 09 March, 1994, p. 3).
"Border Demarcation 'Extremely Badly' Timed," OP. CIT.
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...shifting somewhat to the Russian side, and
around 2,000 square kilometers of land--mainly on
islands in the Amur and its tributaries— have
moved into PRC j urisdiction .
-
Also, some local Russian politicians have made rash
statements which have created an air of confusion and
tension. The governor of the Primorskiy Provence, V.
Ishayev, appeared on local Russian television (fall 1993)
and said, "We will never agree to the handover of Great
Ussuri or Tarabov Islands." 110 This prompted the Chinese
consulate in Khabarovsk to make official inquiries to the
Russian government as to whether this was "the authorities'
official position or whether the governor was speaking
merely as a private citizen." 1 '' Statements of this sort are
clearly at odds with the Russian government policy of
cooperation with China over border issues. However, the
fact that local politicians, regardless of their status or
rank, make these types of statements indicate that when it
comes to the handover of land, however small it may be,
passions among some Russians still run high.





only one who has voiced concern over the status of these two
islands. Ivan Kandaurov, a member of the Amur Region
Russian Geographical Society, wrote an article in which he
claims there is a Chinese plot to annex the "Tarabovo-Ussuri
island group, whose total area amounts to about thirty
square kilometers ." - : These islands mentioned were not
affected by the demarcation efforts as they are located in
an sector of the border near Khabarovsk, in the
Kazakevichevo Channel, which was not covered specifically in
the 1991 treaty. 11 ' Since they were not covered, the status
quo was to be maintained until which time the ownership of
the islands could be negotiated. That is, the islands are,
for the mean time, supposed to remain under Russian
jurisdiction. Mr. Kandaurov has gone on record maintaining
that the Chinese are not satisfied with the status quo, and
purposely had the area left out of the treaty in order to
take advantage of Russia and incorporate the area into the
PRC . He cites as his evidence a Chinese atlas dated 1986
which shows the islands as Chinese territory, and refers to
them by a Chinese name--the Fuyuang Triangle.




Quite some time before the demarcation efforts
were begun, the Chinese had already decided the
fate of the Tarabovo-Ussuri islands. Thus, page
72 of the atlas of Heilongjiang Province,
published back in 1986, shows the Tarabovo-Ussuri
islands as Chinese territory. This atlas is
distributed at various international conferences,
i.e., the concept is being imbued in people of the
Far East that the islands sooner or later will be
transferred to China.' 14
Thus, a number of Russians living in the Far East have
raised the specter of the "Yellow Peril, " inscrutable
Chinese slowly, subtly, quietly taking away Russian
territory island by island.
E . CONCLUSION/OUTLOOK
While the Chinese are quietly making an effort to
demarcate the border on terms as favorably as possible to
them, they are still conducting negotiations with the Moscow
government. The Far Eastern Russians have, through their
inflammatory press reporting, brought the issue of the
disposition of a number of Amur basin islands to the central
government level. These islands, which the Russians
maintain the Chinese are trying to annex, include the two
islands near Khabarovsk (Tarabovo-Ussuri), and Bolshoy
114 Ibid.
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Island in the Ussuri River.
Shortly before the round of talks in Beijing in
February 1994, the Chinese suggested that they were
"prepared to concede Bolshoy Island"- if Russia were to
make a similar concession with regard to the Tarabovo-Ussuri
Islands in the Amur River. This was not acceptable to the
Russians, who do not want to give up the aforementioned
islands near Khabarovsk, though this did not signal the end
of dialogue between the two sides. This Chinese request and
subsequent Russian refusal does, however, signal the
"existence of radical dif ferences, " : '' and indicate that
substantial stumbling blocks still remain.
The differences in the ongoing debate over the
ownership of river islands, were they allowed to deteriorate
to the polemics of the late sixties, would probably lead to
conf lict--given the relative strength of China vis-a-vis the
Russian Republic in the Far East. This, however, is not the
current case. With a few exceptions, most notably the
status of the river islands in the Amur region, the border
issues which resulted in warfare in 1969 have been solved.
"''""Border River Islands Not to be Handed Over to PRC, "
PM2502124394, Moscow, Izvestiya , in Russian, 25 Feb, 1994, (FBIS-




Both sides continue to hold high level talks with regard to
the demarcation of the border, and additional summits are
being planned. The principle actors in these discussions
are Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on one side, and
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on the other. In a
move which clearly illustrates the lengths that both sides
are willing to go to in order to smooth out their
differences over the border, the Russian and Chinese Foreign
Ministers arranged for Chinese President Jiang Zemin to
visit Moscow. 117
The most recent series of meetings between the Russians
and the Chinese began on June 27, 1994, when Qian Qichen
arrived in Moscow. Qichen met with Russian President Boris
Yelstin, the goal being to, "prepare the second Russian-
Chinese summit meeting to be held when Chinese President
Jiang Zemin is expected to visit Moscow."'" In addition to
meeting with President Yeltsin, Qichen met with Andrey
Kozyrev and "initialed an agreement on a fifty-five
kilometer section of the western section of the Russian-
;
'^"Kozyrev Continues Official Visit to PRC, " LD2701 144794
,
Moscow, ITAR-TASS , in English, 27 Jan, 1994, ( FBIS-SOV-94-019, 2:
Jan 1994, p. 4)
.
''''""Chinese Foreign Minister Arrives in Russia on Visit, "
27/6 TASS 260, Moscow, ITAR-TASS , 27 June 1994.
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Chinese border."--' The official signing of this agreement
took place during the most recent in the continuing series
of visits when in September 1994 Chinese President Jiang
Zemin traveled to the Russian-Chinese summit in Moscow. '--
The documents are not yet official, however, and require the
ratification of both the Chinese and Russian parliaments.
Only the demarcation of the Amur region remains. The
previously described sticking points, the issue of ownership
of the channel islands, was discussed yet again during the
fall summit, but to no avail. As of this writing absolutely
no progress has been made on this issue- and the demarcation
of that section of the Far Eastern border will remain
unresolved for the foreseeable future.
Ibid. Though not specifically addressed in this thesis,
this agreement further demonstrates that the Russians and Chinese
are making progress toward the normalization of their long,
common border.
120This was Jiang Zemin's first visit to Moscow as the
Chinese President. In 1991, when he was the Chinese Communist
Party leader, he visited Moscow for five days and signed the
initial pact with Mikhail Gorbachev which brought about the
ongoing border demarcation efforts.
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VII. A POTENTIAL NEW OBSTACLE IN BORDER RELATIONS-
CHINESE INFLUX INTO THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST
A . OVERVIEW
The border dispute between Russia and China has for the
most part been "solved" through diplomatic process. Both
sides have been willing to compromise and not let the
emotional factors of the past get in the way of further
negotiations. However, recent reports, primarily out of the
Russian press point, to new problem areas that are
developing in the far east border region which have the
potential to disrupt current amicable border relations.
These reports claim that there is a growing influence of
Chinese nationals in the Far East Republic of Russia since
the opening of cross border contact in 1987. 1J1 Russian
authorities estimate there has been an influx of up to one
million Chinese nationals into Russia, both by legal and
illegal means. With new bilateral border agreements having
been established, it is natural that cross border contacts
between the Chinese and Russians would increase in kind.
'^After reviewing press reports and communiques out of
Russia and China (FBIS) there has been no noted response by
either the Chinese government or press to the Russian claim of a
deliberate Chinese expansion into the Russian Far East. Also
Chinese press reports have not indicated a "Russian" problem on
their side of the border.
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But now Russians in the Far East region, especially
conservative elements, have begun to voice their concern
over the growing problem of the Chinese influence in the
Russian Far East. Reports out of Moscow and the Far East
Republic point to three specific problem area that have
arisen from the influx of Chinese into Russia:
1. Some conservative Russians in the Far East are
beginning to believe that the Chinese have been
crossing the border to expand their influence in the
Far East Republic of Russia.
2. The influx of Chinese has put an additional strain
on the Far East Russian economy.
3. Crime within Russia has increased due to the
increased border contact and influx of illegal Chinese
aliens
.
B. EXPANSION BY CHINA?
Is there a plot by the Chinese government to expand
it's influence within the Russian Far East? Recent Russian
publications have began to identify this as the reason for
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the increased travels by Chinese citizens into Russian
territory. In a publication written by V. Sharov in the
October 1993 issue of Literaturnaya Gazeta , called "The
China Card, " he outlines "a very gloomy prospect for the
Far East- multimillion Chinese masses hovering menacingly-
over it." Also a series of articles produced by the
Russian press have suggested that the influx of Chinese into
the Russian Far East is part of a determined effort on the
part of the Beijing government. These conservative elements
of the Russian press have purported,
China's silent expansion is under way and that a
vast number of Chinese are illegally penetrating
our territory and living there. These articles
maintain also that the territories bordering China
have been stabbed in the back—government
documents that have been signed are, in fact,
opening our borders to the uncontrolled entry of
Chinese . LJ '
Further, the executive director of the Siberian
Agreement Association of Russia stated in very harsh tones,
"federal [Russian] authorities have been ignoring this
-"Foreign Affairs Official on China Policy," 994K0745A
Moscow Literaturnaya Gazeta in Russian No. 7, 16 Feb 94 pp 9,14
(FBIS-USR-94-002, 9 March 1994)
.
Ibid.
problem."- - " He then went on to state that:
Nearly one million Chinese are currently living in
Siberia and the Far East without permits and
without having registered anywhere (i.e.
illegally) . In effect, they are seizing Russian
territories.''""
This issue of possible Chinese expansion was important
enough to the Governor of the Maritime Province of Russia,
Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, that he brought the matter up to the
government level in August 1993 at a meeting of the Russian
Council of Ministers. He demanded "resolute counteraction
to Chinese expansion" within the Maritime Province of
Russia.- When the Russian Prime Minister, Viktor
Chernomyrdin, visited the Far East in the fall of 1993,
local leaders,
...suggested that the Prime Minister take a number
of measures of a regulatory nature to restrict the
access of Chinese "speculators" to the region. 1 -
- 4
"Emigres from China, CIS Raise Tensions in Siberia,
"
944F0097B Moscow Izvestiya in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition p 5
(FBIS-USR-93-146, 17 November 1993)
.
125Ibid.
^'-"Status of Russian-Chinese Trade Relations," 944Q0098a
Moscow Kommersant in Russian No 46, 22 Nov 93 pp 26-27 (FBIS-USR-
93-162 22 December 1993) .
''-"Ibid.
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This rhetoric of a "Chinese plot" has been for the most
part dismissed by Russian government officials in Moscow.
E. V. Afanasyev, First Deputy Director of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Asia-Pacific
Region spoke for the Foreign Ministry on this account.
We in the Foreign Ministry and in Russia's Embassy
in China have the impression that it is by no
means a question of any long term, conscious,
officially approved strategy. We believe that the
issue of China's claims on our vast territory has
been settled. 128
The Russian fear of overbearing Chinese influence in
Russia is not a new phenomenon. Russian anti-Chinese
chauvinism dates back to the first contact between the two
nations over 300 years ago. A good example of underlying
Russian sentiments toward the Chinese, is a quote by the
Russian author, V. Arsenyev, at the beginning of this
century who stated that, "so long as the China exists, a
yellow danger exists for Russia."'- There are Russians
---"Foreign Affairs official on China Policy," OP... cit.
'"Expanding Chinese Influence in Vladivostok Decried,
"
934F1160B Vladivostok Vladivostok in Russian 1 Sep 93 pp 1, 5
(FBIS-USR-93-132 11 October 1993)
.
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today, some of whom are becoming increasingly vocal, who
share the same sentiments.
C. CHINESE INFLUENCE ON FAR EAST RUSSIAN ECONOMY
There is also growing discontent by the Russian Far
East community who see the Chinese influx as damaging to the
already unstable economy within the region. With the
difficulty for the Russian Far East to implement a "market-
orientated" reform of their economy, also coinciding with an
influx of Chinese "settlers" into the region, Russians have
begun to shift- blame for their economic plight by pointing
to the Chinese influence. They have seen economic border
contacts, especially Chinese "shuttlers" traveling to the
Russian Far East increase dramatically since border
relations improved.
After a long interruption, at the end of the
1980 's agreements were concluded to regulate the
crossing of the Russian-Chinese borders. Now more
than 80 percent of Russian-Chinese commodity
turnover is through border relations, that is in
the Far East. Chinese capital participates in
approximately half of all the joint ventures
created in the region. According to various
figures, for 6.5 million Russians in the Far East
there are from 300,000 to 1 million Chinese. In
the eastern part of [Russia] a new national
minority is already emerging, and unlike the
Russian and the majority of others, it continues
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to increase in numbers."
According to elements of the Russian press, Chinese
influence in trade relations is especially strong in the
Russian Far East. This region accounts for up to eighty
percent of all Russian trade and other contacts with
China.- Rapid development of Russian-Chinese trade
relations has been evaluated by some Russian officials as
"dangerous" to the region. V. Ivankov, the executive
director of the Siberian Agreement Association stated the
view that "cheap" Chinese labor within the Far East is a
myth
.
Guestworkers, most of them from China, come to the
[Maritime Province] under contracts that are
usually concluded with industrial enterprises.
They work on several construction projects in the
province capital and grow vegetables on the
subsidiary farms. Their labor is paid for with
mineral fertilizer, nickel and aluminum. In
short, it is a barter arrangement: workers for raw
materials . - ,2
-°"Status of Russian-Chinese Trade Relations," OP., cit.
'•"-Ibid.
'
"Emigres From China, CIS Raise Tensions in Siberia,
"
944F0097B Moscow Izvestiya in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition
p 5 (FBIS-USR-93-146, 17 November 1993)
.
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An example of this type of arrangement occurred in
1992, when government officials in the Maritime Province
examined the possibility of inviting Chinese workers to
raise vegetables. They were shocked to hear that China
asked for five tons of aluminum for each worker.
Heilongjiang Province, China, on the border of the Russian
Maritime Province, was prepared in 1992 to send 300,000
workers alone to Russia for this type of work. This lead
the author of "Siberia--For Russians Only?", Aleksey
Tarasov, to remark that there were "10 million [Russian
Maritime Province] residents on the verge of unemployment.
Is Siberia now to be used to enhance China's might?"'-
Russians, especially in the Maritime Province, have begun to
blame high unemployment on the Chinese.
Today the Chinese, to a man, are engaged in trade,
thus also resolving at our expense the problem of
employment. More than 80 percent of the Chinese
coming to the Maritime [Province] for various
purposes have the status of "awaiting work" back
home, which factually speaking, means the status
of being unemployed. : ' A
'•'Ibid.
'""Expanding Chinese Influence in Vladivostok Decried, " OP
cit
86
Another aspect of the economic problem for the Russian
Far East is the outflow of capital from the region back into
China by Chinese merchants traveling back and forth between
Russia and China.
In the opinion of the bureaucrats from the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of
Security of Russia, and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, "shuttle" business is now very widespread
(the volume of shuttle operations during the first
half of 1993 reached $614.29 million, according to
Chinese figures) and is one of the main channels
for the outflow of foreign currency from Russia:
In one trip the average Russian "shuttle" brings
$500-3, 000 to China. u
An article in Vladivostok relating the influence of
Chinese in the Russia's Maritime Province, stated, "the
currency drain into China by way of the Maritime [Province
has already become a state problem for Russia." 1 Also
according to this article,
millions of U.S. dollars are going down the
"Chinese hole." This year alone [1993] the total
export of cash currency to China came to
"""Status of Russian-Chinese Trade Relations," 944Q0098A
Moscow Kommersant In Russian No 46, 22 Nov 93 pp 26-27 (FBIS-USR-
93-162, 22 December 1993) .
"
"Expanding Chinese Influence in Vladivostok Decried,
"
934F1160B Vladivostok Vladivostok in Russian 1 Sep 93 pp 1 (FBIS-
USR-93-132, 11 October 1993) .
approximately $50 million. It is not accidental
that special attention was paid to the Chinese
problem by former Russian Federation Minister of
Security Baranikov during his recent trip to the
Far East, and then by Russian Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin, who was seriously concerned about
the extent of the illegal currency export .
-
The Russians also complain that the Chinese have taken
advantage of the Russian economic plight by creating
conditions that are more advantageous to China.
First, one observes the gradual infiltration of
the excess population on the Far Eastern land of
Russia under the guise of agricultural and
construction workers; secondly, the Chinese side
proposes to all its Russian partners the
construction on our territory of real estate on
very favorable terms, promising as much as 80
percent of the financing of such construction but
with the proviso that they be given in exchange as
their property 20-30 percent of the constructed
real estate, primarily in Vladivostok, Nakhodka,
and Khasanskiy Rayon. '"
D. CRIME
The openness of the border region has also brought with
it a sharply worsened crime situation in the Russian Far
East. The Russian Interior Department and the Maritime
Territorial Administration believe "the cause of the growing
- Ibid.
'"Ibid
crime rate is the open border with China." ' According to a
member of the Ministry of Security of the Russian
Administration for the Maritime Province, Vladivostok has
become "the largest contraband center on the Russian-Chinese
border." The officials of the Ministry of Security have
also claimed that the Chinese mafia is beginning to gain a
strong hold within the Far East. Specifically,
the Chinese mafia grouping "triada" has already
opened up channels for delivery from China of
prepared narcotic substances for their sale on the




At a news conference held by the Moscow Ministry of
Security, a worker "expressed the fear that in the near
future Russia would encounter a Chinese mafia that would
make the Chechens look like mere neophytes . - 4 -
There have also been noted instances of cooperation
'""Maritime Kray to Expel Illegal PRC Visitors,"
LD1711170793 Moscow Interfax in English 1103 GMT 17 Nov 1993





-Ibid. Chechens have the reputation of being the most
feared and powerful ethnic group in Russian organized crime.
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between Chinese and Russian criminal elements. In 1993,
three Chinese and two Muscovites were arrested in Moscow for
capturing a Chinese businessmen and demanding a $100,000
dollar ransom. The Chinese who were arrested in Russia were
using falsified passports and entry visas. Connections
between Russian commercial store owners and Chinese
criminals, who sell goods shipped in illegally from China,
have also been documented.- 4 '
It must be noted the governments of Russia and China
are working on cooperative efforts to crack down on crime
and mafia organizations. Th'e Chinese Embassy in Moscow has
stated,
The Chinese Government is keenly aware of a
handful of Chinese citizens who commit, crimes in
Russia and has actively sought cooperation with
the relevant Russian departments in bringing them
to justice. 144
Additionally,
...the [Chinese] embassy is willing to closely
cooperate with the Russian departments in properly
solving problems in accordance with the Russian
laws and norms so as to help preserve and develop
14
'Ibid
^"Chinese Beaten, Robbed During Moscow Turmoil,
"
OW2810034093 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 1000 GMT 23 Oct 93
(FBIS-SOV-93-207 28 October 1993)
.
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To this end Russian and Chinese law enforcement
agencies signed in November 1993, a cooperation agreement
which cracks down on crime and mafia organizations in the
border areas.- 4 ' The agreement was concluded by
representatives of the Maritime Province Internal Affairs
Directorate and Chinese Bodies for Security in Society in
order to "put things [in the border region] in order." '
The document stipulates,
law and order bodies of contiguous territories
will receive full support and assistance in
seeking out law-breakers on both sides of the
border. The appropriate services of both
countries will prepare a universal directory of
the most notorious criminals and, if necessary,
will carry out joint operations to detain them. 14 "
; '
rTbid
" "Far East Border Area, China Sign Anti-Smuggling Accord,"
0W3011054193 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 1300 GMT 6 Nov 93
(FBIS-SOV-93-228 30 November 1993).
* 4
"Border Cooperation Accord Concluded With China,
"
LD0611104793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0404 GMT 6





The agreements signed between Russia and China have
theoretically, on a government to government level, put an
end to the claims and counter-claims regarding their
expansive common border. The respective governments,
remembering all too well the results of the heated polemics
of the 1960's and 1970's, have made great strides in both
the normalization of bilateral relations, but also in the
settlement of the border issue.
Many problems still exist between the two nations, and
it will take several more years before all the outstanding
border issues are resolved. Of the many issues still
affecting the solution of the border problems, the influx of
Chinese into the Russian Far East has become a new and
potentially dangerous obstacle for both players in the
region. However, this issue has up to this point been one-
sided. The Beijing government has remained silent and has
not responded to the continuing rhetoric coming out of
Russia. The Chinese leadership most likely realizes that the
conservative Russians who are responsible for the bulk of
the rhetoric and the anti-Chinese sentiments are not in a
position of central government leadership and, while they
will be watched closely, there is no immediate cause for
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alarm or rash counter action. However, the growing "anti-
Chinese" sentiments, which are becoming more pervasive among
the local Russian community in the Far East, could become






In taking on this topic for our thesis, we initially
set out to prove that the long Russo-Chinese border was
still a major problem, much like it was in the late 1960s,
and that the Chinese had a plan to expand into Russia in a
move similar to that of Nazi Germany in search of
"lebensraum. " We thought this way because to us it seemed
that, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was so weak
and in such disarray that it was ripe for Chinese expansion.
After researching this topic and writing this thesis we have
come to the conclusion that this is not the case. Relations
between Russia and China are cordial, and the Far Eastern
border is not likely to once again become a major source of
contention between the two states.
On a national level, the majority of the problems which
exist with regard to their common border have been hashed
out and declarations/treaties have been signed to that
effect. This is not to say, however, that problems do not
still exist. The issue of the river islands remains
unresolved and, on a regional/local level, there is a great
deal of friction and distrust on the part of both the
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Russians and the Chinese with regard to cross border
relations. This notwithstanding, the border, although at
times a major issue, is' only one in a multitude of aspects
of Russo-Chinese relations. Over the course of the last
three hundred years Russo-Chinese relations have ranged from
alliance to open warfare. The current trend in relations is
positive, though in some ways it appears the Russians and
Chinese have simply agreed to put border problems aside in
favor of taking advantage of each other in other spheres.
An example of this is evident in the regional economic
relations between the two. These economic measures,
sometimes formulated by freelance actors in get rich quick
schemes, though on the surface they illustrate amicable
relations, could in the long run become a source of
dissension. By this we mean simply that the Russian economy
is in dire straits and is desperate for money. The Chinese,
who are in the midst of rapid economic growth, have money to
spend and want Russian technology and military equipment.
The Russians, especially those who reside in the Far East,
have embarked on numerous projects with the Chinese, some
with the blessing of Moscow and others without. These
economic ties with the Chinese, while they do contribute to
the Russian economy, are increasingly seen by some Russians
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as coming at too high a price. For instance the immigration
problem and the loss of Russian jobs to the Chinese, and the
currency drain from the Russian Far East to China has caused
some Russians to sound the alarm. Additionally, and more
ominously, there is growing concern in Russia about the
Chinese military buildup/modernization, especially since the
modernization is being made possible by Russian military
sales to China.
While there remains some nervousness, hesitation, and
plain distrust between the two, the outlook for the
foreseeable future is the maintenance of the status quo
along the border while the two governments focus their
attention on larger, more important internal issues which
can have dramatic effects on the stability and survival of
their respective regimes. This status quo, however, will
depend on just that--the stability and survival of the
Moscow and Beijing governments.
B. POSSIBLE FUTURES
While this thesis is dedicated to the history and
present condition of the long-standing border dispute
between Russia and China, we have, in the course of our
research, run into more questions than we can possibly
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answer. For instance, what will become of China when the
current leadership dies? Will China break up? If and when
China breaks up, what will become of the border between
Russia and China? Conversely, what will become of the
Russian government? Will there be another coup attempt in
the near future? Will the Russian Far East, sparsely
populated, rich in natural resources, and at a great
geographical distance from the center in Moscow, break away
and become an independent state? If this were to occur, in
order to survive separate from the rest of the Russian
Federation, a likely future for such an independent state
would lie with China, regardless of the nature or makeup of
the Chinese state and/or political system.
These scenarios are of course hypothetical and highly
speculative. However, any one of these scenarios, or
combination of them, would have a major effect on Russo-
Chinese diplomatic relations, and by extension effect the
nature of border relations in ways which we are not capable
of discerning at this time. The next few years will be the
test for both China and Russia. The inescapable fact of the
matter is that they have been in contact with each other for
over three hundred years, and in one way or the other they
will be forced to come to terms with each other. As we have
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seen the initial relationship was borne in violence and
warfare. The nature of the relationship during the course
of the next several hundred intervening years was much like
that of a sine wave--there were periodic highs and lows.
The current cycle is on a high note. How long will it last
and what will be the outcome of another falling out? These
questions can only be answered by the passage of time, but
certainly merit close observation as both states have a
major effect on the balance of power in Asia.
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APPENDIX A THE FAR EASTERN BORDER BETWEEN
1689-1860
1. Boundary defined by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689
2. Boundary defined by Treaty of Kiakhta, 1727
3. Boundary defined by the Treaty of Aigun, 1858
4. Territory ceded to Russia in 1858
5. Boundary defined by Treaty of Peking, 1860
6. Territory ceded to Russia in 1860
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